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The Law and Policy of Health Care
Quality Reporting
KRISTIN MADISON*

INTRODUCTION

Health care quality report cards have proliferated over the last decade. There are report cards for hospitals, physicians, medical groups,
nursing homes, and health plans. There are report cards published by
the federal government, state governments, state hospital associations,
local and national nonprofit organizations, health insurers, and other
commercial entities. Report cards vary significantly in the information
they provide; quality measures may be based on structural characteristics of providers, processes of care delivery, patient outcomes, or
patient experiences. Some report cards use stars, some use bars, and
others simply publish quality-related statistics.
Each new report card offers the potential to improve the quality of
medical care. Quality measures can help providers identify potential
quality deficiencies, a crucial early step in the quality improvement
process. Public and private regulators can use quality measures to
identify providers giving low-quality care, and then take action to
improve the quality of care delivered. Public report cards can also reinforce the professional imperative to improve quality, motivating providers through their reputational impact and influence on the competitive
process. Providers seeking to attract patients directly or through referrals may become more successful if they can establish a higher level of
quality. Ultimately, report cards can correct information failures that
plague health care markets and help patients obtain the care they
desire.
At the same time, however, each new report card brings with it a
potential for harm. Just as report cards can change provider behavior
in beneficial ways, they can change provider behavior in problematic
ways. Physicians concerned about their performance may try to obtain
higher scores by selecting as patients people that they think will help
them perform well. If report cards include outcome-based measures,
for example, they may turn away sicker patients. Providers may begin
to "teach to the test," focusing on improving performance in areas that
* Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School, and Senior Fellow,
Leonard Davis Institute of Health Economics.
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are measured, while neglecting or failing to improve care in other
areas, even if the other areas are equally important. But perhaps the
most significant potential for harm arises when report cards are inaccurate or misleading. If providers unknowingly rely on inaccurate
quality measures, they may do nothing when they might otherwise
have looked into a quality problem, or they may waste resources or
even worsen care in an effort to address a problem that does not exist.
If payers or patients rely on poor-quality measures, they may select or
reward physicians and hospitals that provide low-quality care, while
moving away from providers that offer high-quality care. Misinformation may mean worse care.
Will report cards improve or worsen quality? Or might they have
no effect at all? While evidence relevant to these questions is beginning to accumulate, definitive answers remain elusive, at least for now.
Ultimately, report cards' benefits and costs will depend on the ways
that quality measurement and reporting evolve in the next few years.
Numerous stakeholders will shape this evolutionary process, including
providers, government agencies, regulators, insurers, employers, and
consumers, as well as report card producers themselves. By addressing report cards' shortcomings while enhancing their benefits, these
groups can increase the likelihood that quality reporting promotes the
growth of high-quality health care in the United States.
Part I of this Essay provides an overview of hospital and physician
quality reporting in the United States today. It compiles examples of
quality report cards, examines empirical evidence of report cards'
impact, and discusses report cards' problems, including barriers to
consumer use and deficiencies in content and quality. Part II reviews
legal issues that have arisen with respect to quality reporting, focusing
on controversies surrounding health insurers' use and publication of
physician performance measures. It traces the roles of various stakeholders in responding to these controversies and shows how the resolutions reached address broader policy concerns about quality
measures. Drawing on the discussion in Parts I and II, Part III
describes how various stakeholders can take fuller advantage of quality reporting's benefits.
I.

HEALTH CARE QuALITY REPORTING

Health care quality reporting is not a new phenomenon. In the
early 1970s, for example, the Pennsylvania Commissioner of Public
Insurance published a one-page "shopper's guide" to Philadelphia hoshttp://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol31/iss2/2
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pitals.' In the 1980s and early 1990s, several states and the predecessor to the current Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS)
2
began to publish provider-specific health care quality statistics.
Recently, however, the quality reporting trend has greatly accelerated.
While many factors have undoubtedly contributed to this acceleration, 3 two stand out: increasing attention to health care quality concerns and declining information technology costs. Two widely cited
Institute of Medicine reports, To Err Is Human4 and Crossing the Quality
Chasm,5 raised awareness about the health care system's quality shortcomings among medical professionals, policymakers, and, through
media coverage, the general public. Subsequent studies have continued to document problems in health care provision. 6 Concerns about
deficits in the quality of care, whatever their source, help justify the
creation of reporting mechanisms. At the same time, the declining
costs of information technology make it easier and cheaper to collect,
7
analyze, publish, and access quality-related information. The growth
of the Internet has made possible widespread distribution of quality
report cards.
The Nature of Quality Report Cards
While quality report cards exist for many health-related entities,
including nursing homes' and health plans, 9 this Essay will focus on

A.

1. See Nancy Tomes, The Information RX, in MEDICAL PROFESSIONALISM IN A NEW
AGE.(David J. Rothman & David Blumenthal eds., forthcoming 2009)
(describing shopper's guide and history of quality reporting more generally).
2. See id.; see also Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Oversight of the Quality of Medical Care:
Regulation, Management, or the Market?, 37 ARIz. L. REv. 825, 837 (1995) (describing
early quality reporting initiatives).
3. For a more thorough discussion of the many trends underlying the
development of consumer-oriented quality reporting, see generally Tomes, supra note
1.
INFORMATION

4. INST. OF MED., To ERR Is HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM (Linda T.

Kohn et al. eds., 2000).

5. INST. OF MED., CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM: A NEW HEALTH SYSTEM FOR THE
21ST CENTURY (2001).
6. See, e.g., Elizabeth A. McGlynn et al., The Quality of Health Care Delivered to
Adults in the United States, 348 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2635, 2641-42 (2003) (reporting
results of study of medical records that found that deviations from recommended care
threatened public health).
7. For more discussion of information technology's impact on health care quality
reporting and on quality regulation more generally, see Kristin Madison, Health Care
Quality Regulation in an Information Age, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1577, 1595-1601
(2007); see also Tomes, supra note 1 (describing effects of information technology).
8. See, e.g., Medicare.gov, Nursing Home Compare (Jan. 15, 2009), http://www.
medicare.gov/NHCompare/home. asp.
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report cards for two types of providers: hospitals and physicians.
Within each of these categories, report cards take many forms. Turning first to hospital report cards, the entities that choose to publish
quality-related information about hospitals are quite diverse. Producers of report cards include the United States Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS);' states such as Florida, New York, and Pennsylvania; 1" national organizations such as the Joint Commission, 12
which accredits hospitals, and the Leapfrog Group, 13 which promotes
health care safety and quality; local and regional organizations, such
as the North Carolina Center for Hospital Quality and Patient Safety; t 4
commercial entities such as HealthGrades;"5 and health plans. 16
The nature of measures included in these report cards varies considerably. Process of care measures are common among hospital
report card websites. The HHS Hospital Compare website, for example, includes quality indicators based on adherence to care guidelines,
such as the "[p]ercent of surgery patients who were given an antibiotic
at the right time (within one hour before surgery) to help prevent infection," and the "[plercent of [h]eart [a]ttack [platients [gliven [b]eta
[bllocker at [d]ischarge." 17 Some sites report hospital structural characteristics that may be associated with quality; the Leapfrog Group
9. See, e.g., Nat'l Comm. for Quality Assurance, Health Plan Report Card, http://
reportcard.ncqa.org/plan/external/plansearch.aspx (last visited Mar. 17, 2009).
10. See Medicare.gov, Hospital Compare (Feb. 11, 2009), http://www.
hospitalcompare.hhs.gov.
11. Fla. Health Finder, Hospitals and Ambulatory Surgery Centers, http://www.
floridahealthfinder.gov/CompareCare/SelectChoice.aspx (last visited Mar. 17, 2009);
N.Y. State Dep't of Health, New York State Hospital Profile (Oct. 1, 2008), http://
hospitals.nyhealth.gov; PA. HEALTH CARE COST CONTAINMENT COUNCIL ("PHC4"),
CARDIAC SURGERY IN PENNSYLVANIA 2005-2006 (2008), available at http://www.phc4.
org/reports/cabg/06/docs/cabg2006report.pdf.
12. The Joint Comm'n, Quality Check: Find a Health Care Organization, http://
www.qualitycheck.org/consumer/searchQCR.aspx (last visited Mar. 17, 2009).
13. The Leapfrog Group, What Does Leapfrog Ask Hospitals?, http://www.
leapfroggroup.org/for-consumers/hospitals-asked-what (last visited Mar. 17, 2009).
14. N.C. Ctr. for Hospital Quality & Patient Safety, NC Hospital Quality
Performance Report (Dec. 2008), http://www.nchospitalquality.org/.
15. See HealthGrades, Research Hospitals, Doctors and Nursing Homes, http://
www.healthgrades.com/ (last visited Mar. 17, 2009).
16. Independence Blue Cross, HealthGrades Physician and Hospital Quality
Guides, http://www.ibx.com/members/health_resources/healthgrades.html (last
visited Mar. 7, 2009) (describing HealthGrades information available through Blue
Cross website).
17. See Medicare.gov, Explanations of Hospital Process of Care Measures Uan. 14,
2009) (emphasis omitted), http://www.medicare.gov/Hospital/Static/Consumer
Infor mationjtabset.asp?activeTab=2&Language=English&version=default&subTab=4.

http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol31/iss2/2
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site, for example, reports on whether hospitals have adopted computerized prescriber order entry systems. 8 Others report on problems that
arise during care such as infections' 9 or surgery on the wrong body
part.20 A few sites, such as Florida's, report on patient outcomes such
2
as mortality following bypass surgery or hip replacement. ' Hospital
report cards may also include information on patient experiences.
The Hospital Compare site publishes measures drawn from the Hospital Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems survey,
such as measures based on communication with hospital nurses, pain
management, cleanliness, and quietness.2 2
Physician quality reporting is less common than hospital quality
reporting, probably because of the difficulty of developing and collecting meaningful statistical quality measures when each physician sees
relatively few patients. Perhaps the most common type of physician
reporting is that available in state licensure databases, which are not
really report cards, but instead listings of licensed physicians along
with information about characteristics potentially associated with
quality, such as whether the physician is board-certified, has been sub2 3 The
ject to professional discipline, or has paid malpractice claims.
scope of information in such databases varies considerably from state
to state.2 4 Commercial entities such as HealthGrades also provide
such information. 25 States such as New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania calculate a limited set of physician-specific quality measures,
such as cardiac bypass surgery mortality rates and hip and knee
18. See The Leapfrog Group, supra note 13.
19. See, e.g., Mo. Dep't of Health & Senior Servs., Missouri Healthcare-Associated
Infection Reporting, http://www.dhss.mo.gov/HAI/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2009).
20. See, e.g., Div. OF HEALTH POLICY, MINN. DEP'T OF HEALTH, ADVERSE HEALTH
EVENTS REPORTING LAW: MINNESOTA'S 28 REPORTABLE EVENTS 1 (2007), http://www.
health.state.mn.us/patientsafety/ae/adverse27events.pdf.
21. See Fla. Health Finder, Select Inpatient Quality Indicators-Mortality, http://

www.floridahealthfinder.gov/CompareCare/SelectProcedureCondition.aspx

(last

visited Mar. 7, 2009).

22. See HCAHPS, HCAHPS FACT SHEET (2008), http://www.cms.hhs.gov/
HospitalQualityInits/Downloads/HospitaHCAHPSFactSheet200807.pdf.
23. See, e.g., Mass. Bd. of Registration in Med., On-Line Physician Profile Site (Mar.

27, 2009), http://profiles.massmedboard.org/MA-Physician-Profile-Find-Doctor.asp;
Va. Bd. of Med., Practitioner Information, http://www.vahealthprovider.com/ (last
visited Mar. 27, 2009).
24. For a comparison of types of data available on state medical board websites,
see Pub. Citizen, 2006 Report on Doctor Disciplinary Information on State Web Sites,

http://www.citizen.org/hrg/forms/medicalboards/2006/medicalboard.cfm

(last

visited Mar. 27, 2009).
25. See HealthGrades, supra note 15.
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replacement infection rates. 26 Health insurers may provide information related to physician quality by tiering physicians according to performance or creating high-performance networks.2 7 Medicare began
tracking physician quality measures on a voluntary basis-about sixteen percent of physicians participated in the program in 2007-but
has not published this data.2 8 Consumers offer their own assessments
of individual physician quality on public websites. 2 9 In some commu30
nities, quality ratings are also available for physician groups.
B.

The Impact of Quality Report Cards

Part I.A's compilation of examples of quality report cards suggests
that quality reporting has become a widespread phenomenon. Health
care provider report cards have indeed become quite common. Their
ubiquity, however, does not necessarily translate into significant
impacts on health care quality. First, the fact that report cards exist
does not mean that people regularly read them. Second, even if
patients and providers are familiar with report cards, they may not
respond to their contents by altering their behavior in ways that
26. See, e.g., NJ.

DEPT. OF HEALTH

&

SENIOR SERVS.,

HEALTH CARE

QUALITY

2004, at 9-16 (2007), available at http://
www.state.nj.us/health/healthcarequality/documents/cardconsumer04.pdf; N.Y.
STATE DEPT. OF HEALTH, ADULT CARDIAC SURGERY IN NEW YORK STATE 2003-2005, at 2133 (2008), available at http://www.heath.state.ny.us/diseases/cardiovascular/heart_
disease/docs/2003-2005 adult cardiac surgery.pdf; PA. HEALTH CARE COST
CONTAINMENT COUNCIL, TOTAL HIP AND KNEE REPLACEMENTS: FISCAL YEAR 2002 (2005),
available at http://www.phc4.org/reports/hipknee/02/docs/hipkneeFY2002report.
pdf.
27. See, e.g., Debra A. Draper et al., Ctr. for Studying Health Sys. Change, HighPerformance Health Plan Networks: Early Experiences, ISSUE BRIEF, May 2007, available
at http://www.hschange.com/CONTENT/929/929.pdf (describing creation and
operation of high-performance networks); Glen Mays et al., Ctr. for Studying Health
Sys. Change, Tiered-ProviderNetworks: PatientsFace Cost-Choice Trade-Offs, ISSUE BRIEF,
Nov. 2003, available at http://www.hschange.com/CONTENT/627/627.pdf
(describing provider tiering).
28. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.,
PHYSICIAN QUALITY REPORTING INITIATIVE: 2007 REPORTING EXPERIENCE 3 (2008),
ASSESSMENT: CARDIAC SURGERY IN NEW JERSEY

available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/PQRI/Downloads/PQR12007ReportExperience.

pdf.
29. See, e.g., RateMDs.com, Doctor Ratings and Reviews, http://www.ratemds.com
(last visited Mar. 7, 2009) (providing physician ratings based on survey of website
users).
30. See, e.g., Cal. Office of the Patient Advocate, Medical Group Ratings, http://
www.opa.ca.gov/report-card/medicalgroupcounty.aspx (last visited Mar. 7, 2009);
Mass. Health Quality Partners, http://www.mhqp.org (last visited Mar. 7, 2009).

http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol31/iss2/2
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improve health care quality. The real-life impact of quality report cards
must be assessed empirically.
1. Patients' Report Card Use
The pervasiveness of "best physicians" issues of local magazines
hints at widespread public interest in health care provider ratings.
More systematic evidence confirms such interest. 31 At the same time,
however, surveys show that only a minority of the public has seen
report cards, and only a subset of those who have seen them actually
use them. The majority of respondents to a 1996 telephone survey of
Pennsylvania bypass surgery patients said that they were interested in
quality ratings and that they would change surgeons if they discovered
that their surgeon had a higher than expected mortality rate.3 2 But
only twelve percent of the patients knew about the availability of
bypass surgery report cards, and an even smaller percentage made a
decision based on them. 3 3 The low rates of patient awareness should
obviously concern report card advocates, given the relevance of the
report card results to the patients surveyed. However, the extent to
which early studies such as this one retain their relevance is open to
question. The survey predated the growth of the Internet, through
which most report cards are available today. The relative ease of locating and using Internet-based report card information would seem to
greatly expand access to report cards.
Recent surveys suggest that access to quality reporting has in fact
expanded. In 2008, for example, one survey found that about twenty
percent of Americans saw comparative quality information on hospitals.34 The same survey found that about twelve percent of respondents saw information on physicians, a result consistent with the lower
availability of physician report cards. 3 5 Just as for the 1996 Penn31. For evidence on interest in provider ratings, see

KATHERINE

M.

HARRIS &

MELINDA BEEUWKES BUNTIN, ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND., CHOOSING A HEALTH CARE

(2008), available at http://www.rwjf.
org/files/research/051508.policysynthesis.qualityinfo.rpt.pdf, and sources cited
therein.
32. Eric C. Schneider & Arnold M. Epstein, Use of Public Performance Reports, 279
JAMA 1638, 1640 (1998).
33. Id.
PROVIDER: THE ROLE OF QUALITY INFORMATION 3

34.

KAiSER FAMILY FOUND.,

2008

UPDATE ON CONSUMERS' VIEWS OF PATIENT SAFETY

6 (2008), available at http://www.kff.org/kaiserpolls/
upload/7819.pdf. Only six percent of respondents reported having heard of the
Department of Health and Human Services' hospital comparison website. Id. at 8.
35. Id. at 6. Use of quality ratings may be higher for certain groups. For example,
about a third of respondents to a 2008 survey of Internet users between the ages of
AND

QUALITY INFORMATION
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sylvania study, however, the percentage of respondents who actually
used report card data was lower than these numbers imply-about
seven percent for hospitals, and about six percent for physicians. 3 6
Similarly, a survey of California Internet users found that the percentage who saw physician ratings reached twenty-two percent in 2007,
but that only five percent of respondents considered a change of physicians based on the ratings, and only two percent actually did so. 3 7
Many commentators label these usage levels as "low," and indeed
they are in absolute terms. Most Americans do not use health care
quality report cards. The statistics could be interpreted in another
way, however; these numbers could be viewed as quite substantial,
given that many people have little reason to look over health care quality ratings, much less search them out. Healthy individuals may not
read report cards because they have little reason to visit health care
providers. Individuals who do use hospital or physician services may
not bother consulting report cards if their health plans or geographical
circumstances constrain their choice of providers. And individuals
who are satisfied with their current providers may ignore report cards,
despite their lack of knowledge about their current providers' clinical
quality. Patients who see no reason to switch providers would be
unlikely to devote much time to report cards. In 2007, only about
eight percent of Americans chose a new primary care practitioner, and
about seven percent chose a new specialist." These statistics offer
one reason why relatively few people are seeking out report cards.3 9
twenty-one and sixty-four with traditional private insurance reported that their health
plan provided information on physician quality; of those respondents, about sixty
percent reported trying to use this information. See Paul Fronstin, Employee Benefit
Research Inst., Findings from the 2008 EBRI Consumer Engagement in Health Care
Survey, EBRI ISSUE BRIEF, Nov. 2008, at 33, 39, available at http://www.ebri.org/pdf/
briefspdf/EBRI IB_11-20081.pdf.
36. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., supra note 34, at 7.

37.

CAL. HEALTHCARE FOUND., JUST LOOKING: CONSUMER USE OF THE INTERNET TO
CARE 10 (2008), available at http://www.chcf.org/documents/healthit/

MANAGE

ConsumerInternetUse.pdf.
38. Ha T. Tu & Johanna R. Lauer, Ctr. for Studying Health Sys. Change, Word of
Mouth and Physician Referrals Still Drive Health Care Provider Choice, RES. BRIEF, at 3
(2008), available at http://hschange.org/CONTENT/1028/1028.pdf.
39. Of course, for report card advocates, some of these explanations for low report
card use may be more reassuring than others. If report cards are to realize their full
potential for increasing quality, even satisfied patients should seek out report cards on
providers' clinical quality. Poor report card ratings might influence previously
satisfied patients' choices of providers. The more patients who use report cards, the
greater the likelihood that report cards will influence behavior.

http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol31/iss2/2
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On the other hand, surveys suggest that report cards lag behind
other sources of information for patients selecting new physicians.
For example, one survey found that while about eleven percent of
patients used the Internet in selecting a primary care practitioner,
close to twenty-seven percent of patients relied only on friends and
relatives. 4" Similarly, patients were more likely to rely on physician
referrals, friends or relatives, or health plans in selecting specialists
than to rely on the Internet. 4 1 Ultimately, survey evidence indicates
that patients are using report cards to make health care decisions, but
in limited numbers.
2.

Effects of Report Cards on Market Share

Survey evidence offers only one perspective on the impact of
report cards, and it has the limitation that it can show only what
respondents say they do. An alternative approach to evaluating report
cards' effects is to use objective empirical evidence to assess what people actually do in response to report cards. This approach has the
advantage of taking into consideration not just patients' conscious
decisions based on their own examinations of report cards, but also
any other pathways through which report cards might affect behavior.
For example, patients' physicians, friends, neighbors, or even their
insurers might have seen report card results and then taken steps to
steer patients toward or away from particular providers. Typically,
studies taking a non-survey based empirical approach examine
whether providers' treatment volumes or market shares change in
response to report card results.
Some of these studies find effects, while others do not. For example, a study from the early 1990s found that hospitals and physicians
that performed better on the New York cardiac surgery report card
gained market share.4 2 A 2004 study determined that hospitals that
performed poorly on the same report card lost relatively healthy
patients to other hospitals.4 3 Another 2004 study of several report
cards in New York and California concluded that for hospitals
40. Tu & Lauer, supra note 38, at 4.
41. Id.
42. Dana B. Mukamel & Alvin I. Mushlin, Quality of Care Information Makes a
Difference: An Analysis of Market Share and Price Changes After Publication of the New
York State Cardiac Surgery Mortality Reports, 36 MED. CARE 945 (1998).
43. David M. Cutler et al., The Role of Information in Medical Markets: An Analysis of
Publicly Reported Outcomes in Cardiac Surgery, 94 Am. ECON. REv. 342, 345 (2004)
(finding hospitals with high-mortality flag experience decrease in volume relative to
other hospitals).
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reported to be either high-quality or low-quality outliers, "[v]olume
effects were modest, transient, and largely limited to white Medicare
patients in New York."4 4 A 2006 study found that the New York report
cards did not affect market share. 45 Citing a range of conflicting studies published through early 2006, the most recent systematic review of
studies concluded that, overall, report cards did not alter choices of
treatment hospitals.4 6
More recent studies, however, suggest that under the right conditions, report cards may alter patient choices. A 2008 study explained
that report cards will not shift market share if they do not inject into
the market any new information about quality; market participants
may already have views about the quality of providers that are simply
reinforced by report cards.4 7 Examining the period when New York
cardiac report cards were first introduced, the authors showed that
when report cards did contain negative new information about hospitals, these hospitals subsequently lost market share. 48 Interestingly,
however, they did not show a systematic shift of patients toward hospitals with positive news.4 9
While many studies of market share changes focus on cardiac
report cards, a 2008 working paper examined the impact of report
cards in a different setting: fertility clinics.5 0 Report cards would seem
to have great potential in this setting. As the authors explain, birth rate
measures are easy to understand, facilitating report card use; fertility
44. Patrick S. Romano & Hong Zhou, Do Well-Publicized Risk-Adjusted Outcomes
Reports Affect Hospital Volume?, 42 MED. CARE 367 (2004). Other studies have also
found that report card effects may vary according to patient characteristics. For
example, a study of the effect of report cards on kidney transplant centers found "some
evidence that report cards influence younger and college-educated patients," but that
"overall report cards do not affect demand." David H. Howard & Bruce Kaplan,
Do
Report Cards Influence Hospital Choice? The Case of Kidney Transplantation,43 INQUIRY
150, 150 (2006).
45. Ashish K. Jha & Arnold M. Epstein, The Predictive Accuracy of the New York
State CoronaryArtery Bypass Surgery Report-Card System, 25 HEALTH AFF. 844 (2006).
46. Constance H. Fung et al., Systematic Review: The Evidence That Publishing
Patient Care Performance Data Improves Quality of Care, 148 ANNALS INTERNAL MED.
111, 113 (2008).
47. David Dranove & Andrew Sfekas, Start Spreading the News: A Structural
Estimate of the Effects of New York Hospital Report Cards, 27 J. HEALTH ECON. 1201,
1201 (2008).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1207.
50. M. Kate Bundorf et al., Do Markets Respond to Quality Information? The Case of
Fertility Clinics (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 13888, 2008),
availableat http://www.nber.org/papers/w13888.
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services are not emergency services, giving patients time to seek out
the provider-specific information available in report cards; and fertility
patients are disproportionately young and highly educated, increasing
the likelihood that they would have the appropriate knowledge and
skills to take advantage of report cards." The study found that after
fertility clinics began to publicly report birth rates through a national
report card system, clinics with higher birth rates gained market
share.5 2 The study suggests that report cards can in some circumstances influence a patient's choice of providers.
3.

Effects of Report Cards on Quality

Provider selection is a potentially important mechanism by which
report cards may improve quality, but it is not the only one. Even if
few patients actually select alternative providers, health care providers
may respond to report cards by trying to improve their own quality.
Providers' concern about their professional reputation among peers or
the public, or more simply a desire to deliver the highest quality of care
possible, may motivate quality improvement. One way to examine the
aggregate effects of report cards' various quality improvement mechanisms is to look at whether there is a connection between report card
publication and quality improvement. Evidence of a connection could
take the form of quality improvement activities undertaken in
response to report cards or, alternatively, actual post-report card quality improvement as indicated by the quality measures themselves.
In the quality effect context, just as in the market share context,
the most frequently studied report card is probably the New York
bypass surgery report card.5 3 One article offered detailed descriptions
of the actions of specific New York hospitals in light of their report
card performance. 5 4 While it acknowledged that there was little evidence that mediocre hospitals sought to improve their performance in
response to their report card results, 55 it found that hospitals that per-

formed especially poorly implemented many changes in their surgery
programs in order to improve quality.5 6 Consistent with this anecdotal
evidence of quality improvement activities, a study using patient data
to evaluate the New York report card's effects concluded that poorly
51. Id. at 19-21.
52. Id. at 19.
53. See, e.g., Jha & Epstein, supra note 45.
54. See Mark R. Chassin, Achieving and Sustaining Improved Quality: Lessons from
New York State and Cardiac Surgery, 21 HEALTH AFF. 40 (2002).
55. See id. at 48.
56. Id. at 42-45.
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performing hospitals experienced a decline in mortality results soon
after the publication of the report.5 7 In addition, a 2006 study revealed
that the surgeons with the highest mortality rates on these report cards
were more likely than others to discontinue their practices after the
report card release.5 8
Studies of other types of report cards also highlight public reporting's potential to make a difference in health care quality. An assessment of Wisconsin hospital report cards, for example, found that
engagement in quality improvement activities was higher among hospitals subject to public reporting, relative to hospitals that received confidential report cards or no report cards at all. 59 A recent systematic
review concluded that evidence from eleven hospital-level studies suggested that report card publication spurred hospital quality improvement activities.6 °
C.

The Problems of Quality Report Cards

Subpart B concluded that while patients are beginning to use
report cards, such patients remain in the minority; that the evidence
that report cards redirect patients to higher-quality providers is at best
mixed, although some of the most recent studies show an effect; and
that reporting has likely spurred hospital quality improvement activities, although studies of the link between reporting and measurable
quality improvement are limited. These conclusions imply that while
report cards have the potential to improve quality and probably have
begun to do so, they still have a long way to go to reach their full potential for quality improvement. This is an optimistic view. Report card
skeptics would argue that they are unlikely ever to reach their full
potential, while report card critics would argue that they might even
make things worse. At the core of all three of these views lie concerns
about the problems of quality report cards. This subpart describes
these problems.
57. See Cutler et al., supra note 43, at 345.
58. Jha & Epstein, supra note 45, at 844.
59. Judith H. Hibbard et al., Does Publicizing Hospital PerformanceStimulate Quality
Improvement Efforts?, 22 HEALTH AFF. 84, 90-91 (2003). Note, however, that hospitals
were not randomly assigned to the publicly-reported category, raising questions about
whether they may differ in systematic ways from the other hospitals. See id. at 87, 9293.

60. Fung et al., supra note 46, at 111. There is little systematic evidence on the
impact of quality reporting on physician services. Id.
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1. Barriersto Report Card Use
There are many potential explanations for why report card use is
not yet widespread. Subpart B.1 described one possibility: many consumer-patients may not see the need for report cards, because they do
not need a provider, have a limited choice of providers, or are satisfied
with their current providers. Survey evidence suggests that many people are not aware of existing quality differentials,6 1 which would
dampen any enthusiasm they might otherwise have for searching out
comparative quality information. Another possibility is that report
cards are relatively new, and it may simply take time for people to
become aware of their existence. Finding them on the Internet may
take even longer; searching for the term "hospital quality" or "hospital
report card" does not always turn up relevant report cards, even if they
do exist. In addition, some people face considerable barriers to report
card use, such as a lack of Internet access or cognitive or physical limitations on the ability to acquire and use information. Hard-to-understand formatting can significantly magnify such barriers, further
62
discouraging report card use, as well as leading to improper use.
2.

The Content of Report Cards

Other explanations for limited use of report cards stem from their
content. Simply put, people will not use report cards unless they perceive their content to be "useful." For some users, report cards fall
short along this dimension. One fact readily apparent from Subpart
A's survey of the report card landscape is that although report cards
are increasingly common, relatively few focus on physician-specific
quality measures. Hospital quality measures can of course be useful;
poor-quality hospital care often has serious health consequences. For
many people, however, hospital admissions are rare, and those that do
occur are guided by referring physicians, heavily influenced by geographical considerations, or constrained by health plans. By contrast,
61. See KAISER FAMILY FOUND., supra note 34, at 9 (reporting that only forty-one
percent of respondents perceived "big differences" in local hospital quality, thirtythree percent in specialist quality, and thirty percent in primary care physician
quality); see also HARRIS & BUNTIN, supra note 31, at 10 (describing reasons consumers
decline to use hospital quality information, including "[h]igh levels of satisfaction with
one's own provider and lack of perceived quality differences across providers").
62. See for example, HARRIS & BUNTIN, supra note 31, at 10 and sources cited
therein (describing problematic report card formats); Judith H. Hibbard & Ellen
Peters, Supporting Informed Consumer Health Care Decisions: Data Presentation
Approaches That Facilitate the Use of Information in Choice, 24 ANN. REv. PUB. HEALTH
413 (2003) (describing how presentation of data in report cards may affect their use).
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patients visit physicians frequently and often select physicians (especially primary care practitioners) with little professional help. Also,
patients generally have a broader choice of physicians than of hospitals. The relative lack of report cards on physician services is therefore
highly problematic.
Another limitation on the usefulness of report cards is the nature
of their performance measures. Developing appropriate measures of
clinical quality can be difficult. The ideal measures, whether structure,
process, or outcome-oriented, would be based on reliable evidence that
establishes an association with dimensions of quality valued by
patients. However, there are many areas in health care for which systematic evidence of the best treatment approaches is lacking. Furthermore, particularly for process-oriented and outcome-oriented
measures, limitations on available data and statistical techniques complicate efforts to develop statistically reliable quality measures that differentiate providers sufficiently to make quality ratings meaningful.
And collecting the right data for report cards can be burdensome.
The challenges inherent in developing report cards have meant
that even the most developed report cards contain limited data. The
ideal report card for a particular patient at a particular time would be
tailored to that patient's needs. First, clinical quality measures would
be for the condition the patient has or the treatment the patient needs.
A patient in need of obstetrical services would want to know about the
quality of a physician's obstetrical services, as well as the quality of the
obstetrics unit within the hospital. A patient in need of cancer treatment would be interested in how providers' cancer patients fare, particularly patients with similar types of cancer, at similar stages. There
are a few report cards that contain measures directed at a particular
type of patient; the bypass surgery report cards are one example. But
what if I am an obstetrics patient? Is a hospital's overall infection rate
a key measure to consider in choosing a hospital? Or might infection
rates vary across units within the hospital? Would the Hospital Compare clinical quality statistics on cardiac care, pneumonia care, and
certain infection prevention measures be relevant? 63 What if I need
surgery, but not cardiac surgery or knee surgery? What report cards
would be helpful to my choice of providers? Many existing quality
measures are very broad, potentially masking variations within an
institution. The overall hospital surgical site infection rate may be one
example. Others are focused on just a few conditions or treatments,
leaving patients with other conditions and patients in need of other
63. See Medicare.gov, supra note 10.
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treatments to wonder about the report cards' relevance. The more that
an individual provider's quality is correlated across treatment types
and settings, the less of a problem it is to focus on just a few conditions. But without more information about such a correlation, potential report card users cannot simply assume that report cards focusing
on different conditions or treatments provide useful information.
Second, in an ideal world, report card measures would focus on
clinical outcomes. Patients care about outcome measures such as
lower mortality rates, not whether physicians are board-certified or the
frequency of beta blocker prescriptions in hospital settings. These
alternative measures are imperfect at best, and are used mainly
because it can be costly and difficult to measure outcomes and to riskadjust them properly, so that they reflect the providers' quality, rather
than underlying patient characteristics. In practice, very few report
cards measure outcomes, and the outcomes they capture tend to be a
limited subset of what patients may care about. The Hospital Compare report card, for example, offers three outcome measures: heart
attack mortality rates, heart failure mortality rates, and pneumonia
mortality rates.6 4 Pennsylvania's knee and hip replacement report
cards report on deep joint infections and device problems, blood clots,
wound infections, re-admission rates, and post-operative lengths of
stay.65 But other types of patients may wonder about other mortality
rates, and all patients may wonder about other kinds of outcome measures. What are the mortality rates for neurosurgery patients? To
what extent is a provider's treatment successful in restoring functioning? How long is the typical recovery period? There are many variations on these types of questions, and few of them are addressed in
existing report cards.
While report cards' objective clinical quality measures may fall
short of the ideal, many patients would argue that their improvement
would only go part of the way toward making quality report cards truly
useful. Patients care about more than just objective clinical quality
measures; they care a great deal about non-clinical quality measures
such as convenience and amenities. A 2007 survey found that the
share of patients who considered convenience a factor in choosing a
physician was on par with the share who considered reputation or perceived quality a factor.6 6 A 2008 working paper found that while lower
pneumonia mortality rates contributed to higher patient demand for a
hospital's services, increases in perceived hospital amenities were asso64. Id.
65. PA. HEALTH CARE COST CONTAINMENT
66. Tu & Lauer, supra note 38, at 6.

COUNCIL,

supra note 26, at 7-11.
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ciated with much greater increases in demand.6 7 One could easily
imagine that factors such as convenient parking, better hospital food,
or shorter appointment waiting times might be relevant to patients.
Patients also highly value information about other patients' experiences with physicians and hospitals.6 8 The Institute of Medicine has
included among its aims for quality improvement "patient-centered"
care; systematic surveys of patient experiences support this goal.6 9
Several websites have begun to publish results from such surveys. For
example, in 2007, Massachusetts Health Quality Partners published
doctor's office-specific ratings based on surveys returned by 51,000
adult patients about factors such as how well doctors communicate
with patients, how well doctors coordinate patient care, and the helpfulness of office staff.70 And in 2008, the Hospital Compare website
introduced a set of quality measures drawn from the Hospital Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems, a survey
which asks discharged hospital patients for ratings in areas such as
communication with nurses and doctors, pain management, and the
provision of discharge information, as well as for ratings of the hospital as a whole.7 ' Many of the factors assessed by these surveys are
clinically relevant, and studies have found a positive (although imperfect) correlation between patient experience and other kinds of clinical
quality measures.7 2
67. Dana Goldman & John A. Romley, Hospitals as Hotels: The Role of Patient
Amenities in Hospital Demand (Nat'l Bureau Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
14619, 2008) (noting that "[a]menities such as good food, attentive staff, and pleasant
surroundings may play an important role in hospital demand" and finding that a "onestandard-deviation increase in amenities raises a hospital's demand by 38.4% on
average, whereas demand is substantially less responsive to clinical quality as
measured by pneumonia mortality.").
68. See HARRIS & BUNTIN, supra note 31, at 3 (citing sources); see also Beckey
Bright, Patient Surveys Seen as Reliable for Rating Health-Care Providers, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 23, 2008 (describing poll result that ninety-one percent of respondents would be
likely to consult health plan enrollees' ratings on trust, communications, medical
knowledge, availability, and office environment when selecting a physician).
Individual patients also frequently share their experiences with health care providers
through the Internet, yet another example of widespread interest in patient
experiences.
69. See BD. ON HEALTH CARE SERVS., INST. OF MED., PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT:
ACCELERATING IMPROVEMENT 118-19 (2006) (describing quality aims, including patient
centeredness, and providing examples of patient-centered performance measures).
70. Mass. Health Quality Partners, Quality Insights: 2007 Patient Experiences in
Primary Care, http://www.mhqp.org/quality/pes/pesMASumm.asp?nav=031600 (last
visited Mar. 7, 2009).
71. See HCAHPS, supra note 22, at 1.
72. See HARRIS & BUNTIN, supra note 31, at 7, and sources cited therein.
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Given patients' interest in aspects of provider performance other
than those captured by technical clinical quality measures, one potential way to increase the impact of report cards is to expand the effort
devoted to reporting on factors such as amenities and patient experiences. Perhaps consumer preferences ought to make a difference in
the health care context, just as they do in other contexts. Report cardinduced selection and competition based on these characteristics may
very well benefit patients.
At the same time, though, there is reason to be cautious in
expanding report cards' focus on patient experiences, especially if it
comes at the cost of directing attention and resources away from the
development of other quality measures. One reason to temper enthusiasm about patient experience measures involves the economic principle of comparative advantage. 7 3 Under this principle, even if one
entity is better than another at producing each of two goods, it is economically more efficient for the first entity to produce the good that it
has the bigger advantage in producing, while the second entity produces the other good.7 4 This reasoning suggests that even if report
card providers are superior to consumers at collecting both experience
measures and technical quality measures, it may make sense for report
card providers to increase their focus on technical quality measures.
After all, consumers can collect some information about patient experiences. Prospective patients can ask friends or family about their
experiences with specific providers, an approach that is particularly
beneficial if the prospective patients know that these family and
friends share their preferences. Friends and family are in practice a
very important source of information about quality.7 5 By contrast,
consumers would find it nearly impossible to assemble technical
clinical quality data on their own.
This is not to say that systematic patient experience surveys are
not useful; they certainly are. Some people may not know others they
can ask or may be reluctant to ask questions that are too personal.
They may not have the time to talk to a sufficient number of patients to
develop a meaningful assessment of patient experience with a specific
73. See JOHN B. TAYLOR & AKILA WEERAPANA, PRINCIPLES OF MACROECONOMICS 6 (6th
ed. 2009) ("In general, a person or group of people has a comparative advantage in
producing one good relative to another good if that person or group can produce that
good with comparatively less time, effort, or resources than another person or group
can produce that good.").
74. See id. at 6 (defining comparative advantage); see also id. at ch. 29 (discussing
comparative advantage in more detail).
75. See, e.g., HARRIS & BUNTIN, supra note 31, at 9 (describing patterns of use of
various types of quality information).
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provider. They may not ask the right questions. Well-designed
surveys can capture elements of patient experience that prospective
patients may benefit from learning about, but simply not think to ask.
In addition, experience surveys provide feedback to providers, who
can then look for ways to improve satisfaction with their services. But,
ultimately, the question is not just whether patient experience surveys
are beneficial; the question is what level of resources to devote to them
when these resources could instead support clinical quality measures
that consumers have no way of collecting on their own.
If you asked patients whether they would prefer to see patient
experience measures or clinical quality measures, they might very well
say patient experience measures. People sometimes discount clinical
quality measures. For example, one survey found that the percentage
of respondents who would prefer a surgeon who has treated friends or
family nearly equaled the percentage who would choose a surgeon
whose quality had been rated higher.7 6 Similarly, the survey found
that the percentage of respondents who would choose a familiar hospital (fifty-nine percent) greatly exceeded the percentage who would
choose a more highly rated hospital (thirty-five percent).77 And in a
direct comparison of patient experience measures to more technical
types of quality measures, an experimental study of primary care provider report cards found that nearly one-third of participants chose
providers rated highly on interpersonal quality (in areas such as communication, courtesy, and promptness) but poorly in the delivery of
health care services.7 8
If the preference for interpersonal quality as measured by patient
experience surveys is strong, even on occasions when it is accompanied by subpar delivery of care or poor health care outcomes, then
perhaps report cards' focus on patient experiences should be further
intensified. However, the concern is that patients making decisions
based primarily on information from friends, family, or patient experience surveys, might be doing so because they do not understand
clinical quality measures or their importance. 7 9 If patient decisions
are driven by a lack of understanding, rather than preferences, then
76. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., supra note 34, at 10.
77. Id.
78. See Constance H. Fung et al., Patients' Preferences for Technical Versus
Interpersonal Quality When Selecting a Primary Care Physician, 40 HEALTH SERVS. RES.
957, 971 (2005).
79. See HARRIS & BuNTIN, supra note 31, at 3 ("There is some indication that
disinterest in clinical performance measures found in focus group studies may be
driven by consumers' perceived lack of expertise regarding the clinical issues
underlying performance data.").
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public benefit-minded report card designers should try to address the
underlying comprehension problem.
3.

The Quality of Report Cards

One reason that patients may be reluctant to rely on clinical quality measures in choosing providers is a concern that the measures do
not accurately reflect quality. Health care providers, policymakers,
researchers, and report card designers share this concern. As
described in Subpart C.2, accurate quality measurement can be very
difficult to achieve. High-quality quality measures are nonetheless critical. Just as well-designed health care quality measures can contribute
to quality improvement, poorly designed quality measures can worsen
quality. First, they can misdirect patients to poor-quality providers
and away from high-quality providers. Patients who rely on problematic health care quality report cards will be worse off as a result. Second, they can misdirect quality improvement efforts. Quality ratings
provide information to health care providers, managers, and payers, as
well as to patients. Providers may focus on improving areas that are
actually already high-quality, thus wasting resources. They might also
overlook areas in need of quality improvement, thus sacrificing opportunities to improve patient treatment. Faulty quality measurements
may lead third parties to reward poor-quality care or penalize highquality care, thus skewing provider incentives.
Third, because providers may be sensitive to these impacts of
poorly designed quality measures, they may alter their behavior
8 0 If a proaccordingly, with potentially problematic consequences.
vider suspects that an outcome measure is not adequately adjusted for
the underlying health risks of patients, for example, the provider might
turn away sicker patients that the provider would otherwise treat. Or
a provider might choose to provide a procedure to a patient to whom
they might otherwise recommend another form of treatment. Such
behavior might increase health care disparities as well as worsen care
overall. Many authors have suggested that physicians might avoid
treating patients who are members of racial minorities, because they
may be concerned that such patients would be less likely to adhere to
81
treatment advice or more likely to have poor outcomes.
80. See, e.g., Rachel M. Werner & David A. Asch, The Unintended Consequences of
Publicly Reporting Quality Information, 293 JAMA 1239, 1239 (2005) (reviewing
potential benefits of report cards but also detailing how they "may have unintended
and negative consequences on health care").
81. See, e.g., Lawrence P. Casalino et al., Will Pay-for-Performance and Quality
Reporting Affect Health Care Disparities?,26 HEALTH AFF. w407, w408 (2007); Huw T.
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Empirical studies have shown that the concern that providers
might react to quality ratings by altering treatment patterns in problematic ways is legitimate. One study showed that bypass surgery
report cards were associated with an increased disparity in bypass surgery use between white patients, on the one hand, and black and Hispanic patients, on the other.8 2 Another, broader study of Medicare
data on cardiac patients from 1987 to 1994 suggested that during their
first four years, New York and Pennsylvania bypass surgery report
cards "led to substantial selection by providers," as indicated by a
decline in illness severity of patients receiving bypass surgery and
declines in certain cardiac procedures for sicker heart attack
patients.8 3 It also found that the report cards led to "improved matching of patients with hospitals," in the sense that more severely ill
patients were increasingly treated at teaching hospitals.8 4 A report
card-induced change in patient mix is not necessarily a bad thing; for
example, if physicians were too aggressive pre-report card in providing
treatment to severely ill patients, resulting in worse outcomes for these
patients, then a finding of declining illness severity would be a positive
result. Such changes are in fact one goal of report cards. Thus, to
determine whether report card-induced changes are socially beneficial,
it is important to look at their impact on health outcomes. The study
authors found that in the aggregate, the changes "led to higher levels of
resource use and to worse health outcomes, particularly for sicker
patients," leading the authors to conclude that "these report cards
decreased social welfare. 8 5
All of these potential problems highlight the importance of highquality report cards. At a minimum, performance measures should
accurately reflect some dimension of a provider's "true" underlying
quality. This means that structure- and process-oriented quality measures should reflect practices known to result in improved health care
outcomes, and that outcome measures should be properly riskadjusted. The measures should be based on current, accurate data.
Ideally, report cards would also be designed to capture the many
dimensions of quality valued by patients, and to reduce the likelihood
0. Davies et al., Health Care Report Cards: Implicationsfor Vulnerable Patient Groups
and the Organizations Providing Them Care, 27 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 379, 393
(2002); Werner & Asch, supra note 80, at 1243.
82. Rachel M. Werner et al., Racial Profiling: The Unintended Consequences of
CoronaryArtery Bypass Graft Report Cards, 111 CIRCULATION 1257 (2005).
83. David Dranove et al., Is More Information Better? The Effects of "Report Cards"
on Health Care Providers, 111 J. POL. ECON. 555, 583 (2003).
84. Id. at 556.
85. Id.
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that a single-minded focus on report card measures would degrade
dimensions. Unintended conquality along other, equally important
86
concern.
a
always
are
sequences
It can be difficult to assess the quality of report cards, in part
because it is not clear what the gold standard should be when every
measurement methodology has a potential flaw. A few studies have
raised concerns based on comparisons of quality report cards, however. A study examining the hospitals that U.S. News & World Report
identified as among "America's Best Hospitals" for "Heart & Heart
Surgery" found lower risk-adjusted mortality rates among the "Best"
hospitals than among non-ranked hospitals, but also found that the
87
list omitted many others that had low mortality rates. A study comparing five websites' ratings for hospitals in the Boston area found that
they failed to agree because they used different measures, considered
the experiences of different patients, and assessed different reporting
periods.8 8 It should not be surprising that different measurement
methodologies and databases generate different rankings, but these
results do serve as a reminder of the importance of careful scrutiny of
report card content.
Other evidence supports a conclusion that report cards can be
sufficiently informative to guide patient choice. The authors of a 2006
study of New York's bypass surgery report cards, for example, concluded that "users who picked a top-performing hospital or surgeon
from the latest available report had approximately half the chance of
dying as those who picked a hospital or surgeon from the bottom quartile."8 9 Another 2006 study found that the Hospital Compare process
of care quality measures predicted differences in hospital risk-adjusted
86. For a discussion of the problems that have arisen in the context of measures of
pneumonia-related quality of care, see Mark L. Metersky, Measuring the Performance of
Performance Measurement, 168 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 347 (2008).
87. Oliver J. Wang et al., "America's Best Hospitals" in the Treatment of Acute
Myocardial Infarction, 167 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1345, 1345 (2007) ("On average,
admission to a ranked hospital for AMI was associated with a lower risk of 30-day
mortality, although about one-third of the ranked hospitals fell outside the best
performing quartile based on RSMR [risk-standardized mortality rates]. Although
ranked hospitals were much more likely to have an SMR significantly less than 1,
many more non-ranked hospitals had this distinction.").
88. Michael B. Rothberg et al., Choosing the Best Hospital: The Limitations of Public
Quality Reporting, 27 HEALTH AFF. 1680, 1680 (2008). For another article comparing
the characteristics of report cards, see Michael J. Leonardi et al., Publicly Available
Hospital Comparison Web Sites, 142 ARCHIVES OF SURGERY 863 (2007).
89. Jha & Epstein, supra note 45, at 844.
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mortality rates. 9° Similarly, a 2007 study found that better performance on a set of commonly used process of care quality indicators was
associated with lower mortality. 91 The fact that these studies find a
relationship between report card quality measures and quality outcomes is reassuring, but it does not guarantee that all report cards are
carefully constructed.
II.

A

CASE STUDY: HEALTH PLAN PHYSICIAN RATINGS

Disputes over the use and accuracy of performance ratings have
arisen frequently in recent years, occasionally resulting in litigation.
Some health care providers, for example, have brought defamation or
libel claims against former patients who used the Internet to disseminate negative reviews of their care. 92 Many recent legal developments
related to quality reporting, however, have revolved around disputes
between health care providers and health plans.
A.

Disputes over Health Plan Rating Programs

Health plans have access to large volumes of data about their network physicians. From this data, they can extract cost and quality
information for the purpose of creating "high-performance" networks.9 3 Physician tiering algorithms differ across plans. Historically,
some plans have focused primarily on costs, partly because of the difficulty in assessing quality; others first apply a quality threshold and
then assess efficiency.9 4 Quality measures can be based on practices
90. Rachel M. Werner & Eric T. Bradlow, Relationship Between Medicare's Hospital
Compare Performance Measures and Mortality Rates, 296 JAMA 2694 (2006).
91. Ashish K. Jha et al., The Inverse Relationship Between Mortality Rates and
Performance in the Hospital Quality Alliance Measures, 26 HEALTH AFF. 1104, 1104
(2007) ("The relationship between high HQA performance and lower risk-adjusted
mortality is an important validation for this national hospital quality rating
program.").
92. See, e.g., Shari Roan, Doctor Ratings: Is Your Healthcare Hot or Not?, L.A. TIMES,
May 19, 2008; Deborah Gage, Dentist Sues Over Negative Yelp Review, S.F. CHRON., Jan.
13, 2009, at D1.
93. See, e.g., Draper et al., supra note 27, at 1 (describing creation of highperformance networks); cf. Theo Francis, Insurers' Lists on Doctors Under Fire, WALL
ST. J., Aug. 21, 2007, at D3 (describing major insurers' efforts to create networks that
rate physicians); Jason Roberson, Insurers' Ratings Often Aren't Accurate, Doctors
Complain, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Feb. 10, 2008 (describing ratings systems used by
Texas insurers).
94. See, e.g., Measuring Physician Quality and Efficiency of Care for Medicare
Beneficiaries: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Health of the H. Comm. on Ways & Means,
109th Cong. 37 (2005) [hereinafter House Hearing] (testimony of Peter Lee), available
at http://bulk.resource.org/gpo.gov/hearings/109h/26373.pdf?bcsiscan-DA3493EE
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such as prescribing beta blockers for heart attack patients, performing
blood sugar tests for diabetics, and screening for breast and cervical
cancers.

95

Some employer-sponsored health insurance packages offer enrollees a broad choice of physicians, including both physicians in a highperformance network and physicians outside of it, but highlight the
high-performance network designation in plan directories. 9 6 Star ratings may guide enrollee choices of physicians, just as they sometimes
guide selections of restaurants or movies.9 7 Some employers
encourage the choice of more highly rated physicians through lower
co-payments. 98 Under other plans, lower-rated physicians may be
excluded from provider networks altogether. 9 9
Rating and tiering programs often strain relationships between
health plans and physicians. 10 0 In 2005, for example, UnitedHealthcare operated a pilot program under which it used claims data to
assess patient treatment costs and evaluate quality, as indicated by
measures such as complication rates and adherence to medical guide-

5FC9D524=0&bcsiscanfilename=26373.pdf (describing application of cost and
quality criteria to physicians in Las Vegas health plan); Draper et al., supra note 27, at
2, 5 (describing use of cost and quality in high-performance networks); Hoangmai H.
Pham et al., Redesigning Care Delivery in Response to a High-PerformanceNetwork: The
Virginia Mason Medical Center, 26 HEALTH AFF. w532, w534-35 (2007) (describing one
insurer's rating program). Many of the early tiered-provider networks focused
primarily on cost. See Mays et al., supra note 27.
95. See Emily Berry, Tenn. Blues Reboots Physician Rating Program, AM. MED. NEWS,
Oct. 13, 2008, available at http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2008/10/13/
bisbO13.htm (describing quality rating systems); Ellen Nakashima, Doctors Rated But
Can't Get a Second Opinion: Inaccurate Data About Physicians' Performance Can Harm,
WASH. POST, July 25, 2007, at A01, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/07/24/AR2007072402545.html (same).
96. Draper et al., supra note 27, at 3.
97. Nakashima, supra note 95.
98. Id. See also Draper et al., supra note 27, at 3. One recent plan created three
tiers based on physician rankings, with co-payments of $15, $25, or $35. Jeffrey
Krasner, Insurers Expand Use of Doctor Rankings, BOSTON GLOBE, June 10, 2008,
6
8
available at http://www.boston.com/business/healthcare/articles/200 /0 /l 0/
doctor-rankings/.
use-of
expand
insurers
99. House Hearing, supra note 94; Nakashima, supra note 95.
100. See, e.g., Robert Kazel, Tiered Physician Network Pits Organized Medicine vs.
United, AM. MED. NEWS, Mar. 7, 2005, available at http://www.ama-assn.org/
amednews/2005/03/07/bill0307.htm (noting that in previous three years, several
plans had introduced tiered networks, and "[iun each case, physicians criticized the
plans for an overreliance on cost data and faulty quality data").
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lines.1 °1 Physicians who met United's criteria received a "star" designation. 102 Medical societies, physician groups, and health systems in
St. Louis, Missouri objected to United's plan to implement the program
in their area, arguing in part that risk adjustment for illness severity
was inadequate, that the designations interfered with physician-patient
relationships, that the program rewarded low cost rather than quality,
and that the program considered costs over which physicians had no
control. 10 3 United subsequently modified the rating process and ultimately agreed to work with a local hospital system to develop quality
10 4
and efficiency measures.

More recent efforts to implement rating programs have resulted in
litigation. In 2006, Regence BlueShield used claims data to create a
"Select Network" consisting of physicians who met certain quality and
efficiency criteria. 10 5 After the insurer sent letters to patients of
excluded physicians, explaining that their physicians did not meet the
requisite quality and efficiency standards and that they needed to
select other physicians if they wanted continued coverage, the Washington State Medical Association (WSMA) demanded an apology. 10 6
Regence later sent a letter to its members apologizing for any "[implication] that health care professional(s) who were not invited to participate in the Regence Select Network do not provide quality care," and
delayed implementation of the program."0 7 Nevertheless, WSMA subsequently filed suit seeking damages and an injunction, alleging that
Regence had used outdated data and a flawed methodology to create

101. See Judith VandeWater, Insurance Program Faces Criticism, ST. Louis PosTMar. 3, 2005, at BO1 (describing program);Judith VandeWater, BJC Warns It
May Drop United Healthcare, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Mar. 18, 2005, at Al (examining
program details).
102. See VandeWater, BJC Warns It May Drop United Healthcare, supra note 101, at
Al (explaining star system).
103. See Judith VandeWater, Doctors Level Charges at Health Insurer, ST. Louis PosTDISPATCH, May 26, 2005, at Al (describing physician objections); see also Kazel, supra
note 100 (same).
104. Judith VandeWater, BJC, Health Insurer Resolve Dispute, ST. Louis PosTDISPATCH, June 24, 2005, at Al.
105. Doctors Outraged at Ratings, OREGONIAN, May 26, 2006, at D04.
106. Id.
107. Amy Lynn Sorrel, Washington Doctors Sue Blues Plan over Performance
Standards, AM. MED. NEWS, Oct. 16, 2006 (alteration in original) (internal quotation
marks omitted), available at http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2006/10/16/
prsdO16.htm.
DISPATCH,
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the network.' °8 Causes of action included defamation, breach of contract, and violation of Washington's Consumer Protection Act. 10 9
Other lawsuits have followed. In 2007, for example, the Fairfield
County Medical Association sued health plans that had created rating
programs designating some physicians as elite." 0 Similarly, in 2008,
the Massachusetts Medical Society sued an entity that purchases
health insurance for Massachusetts state employees."' It alleged that
the entity implemented a tiering program that had mis-tiered physicians, "falsely conveying the message to patients, the medical profession, and the community that the Mis-Tiered Physicians provide lower
quality and less cost-effective care than physicians who are placed into
a better tier .... Defendants have insufficiently reliable or valid meth-

odology to measure the quality of care provided .... 12 The plaintiffs'
causes of action included violation of procedural due process rights,
viodefamation, tortious interference with advantageous relationships,
1 13
contract.
of
breach
and
Act,
Protection
Consumer
the
of
lation
At the core of all of these suits are physicians' concerns about the
validity of measures used, the accuracy of underlying data, and the
conflation of quality and cost criteria in creating tiers. The Regence
suit resulted in a settlement agreement that reflects many of these con108. See id. (describing suit); see also CHRISTINE C. RINN, AM. HEALTH LAWYERS ASS'N,
A NEw TWIST ON AN OLD ISSUE 8 (2008), available at http:/
/www.crowell.com/documents/Tiered-PhysicianNetworksAHLARinnpdf.pdf.
109. See RINN, supra note 108, at 8.
110. See, e.g., id. (describing suit); Amy Lynn Sorrel, Resistance Builds Against
Insurers' Tiered Networks, AM. MED. NEWS, Sept. 17, 2007, available at http://www.
ama-assn.org/amednews/2007/09/17/pr120917.htm.
111. First Amended Complaint at 1, Mass. Med. Soc'y v. Group Ins. Comm'n, Civil
Action No. 08-2124 (Mass. Super. Ct. May 21, 2008), available at http://www.
massmed.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=home&TEMPLATE=/CM/ContentDisplay.
cfm&CONTENTID=21896; Amy Lynn Sorrel, Massachusetts Doctors Sue, Saying
Ranking Programis Flawed, AM. MED. NEws, July 7, 2008, availableat http://www.amaassn.org/amednews/2007/09/17/pr120917.htm.
112. See First Amended Complaint, supra note 111, at 2.
113. Id. One author has enumerated numerous potential causes of action in tiering
cases: breach of contract; defamation or libel; state unfair trade practices or consumer
protection violations; unfair insurance practices act violations; tortious interference
with contractual relations; fraud; and conspiracy. RINN, supra note 108, at 4-7.
Another group of authors adds the following: violation of statutory or common law
due process requirements; violation of federal laws regulating health plans; violation
of laws applicable to sponsored health plans; restraint of trade; and civil rights laws

TIERED PHYSICIAN NETWORKS:

violations.

SARA ROSENBAUM ET AL., AN ASSESSMENT OF LEGAL ISSUES RAISED IN "HIGH

PERFORMING" HEALTH PLAN QUALITY AND EFFICIENcY TIERING ARRANGEMENTS:

CAN THE

(2007), available at http://www.rwjf.org/files/research/
physiciantieringl02007.pdf.
PATIENT BE SAVED?
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cerns. Regence agreed that for two years, before adopting a program
involving performance measurement, it would disclose its measurement methodology and seek input from WSMA on topics such as the
timeliness of data, risk-adjustment issues ("comparability of physician
practices and patient populations"), and the appropriateness of apply4
ing measures to a given physician ("physician attribution issues").1
Regence further agreed to post on its provider website its methodology,
including an explanation of the data used.' 1 5 It also promised to permit physicians to appeal their scores, and if the physician disagreed
with the outcome of the internal appeal, to permit binding review by
an independent external reviewer. 116 Disclosure of tiering methodologies and the availability of opportunities for appeal are important first
steps toward ensuring the quality of quality ratings.
B.

Redesigning Ratings: A Public Regulator's Role
Litigation between physicians and health plans has not been the
only force shaping the nature of rating programs. In 2007, New York's
Office of the Attorney General took a series of actions that will likely
exert an enduring influence over their future development.
1. The New York Attorney General Gets Involved
In the summer of 2007, New York's Office of the Attorney General
issued letters to several major insurers concerning their physician
ranking programs. 1 17 These letters outlined concerns about the quality rating programs, warned of the risk that they would confuse the
public, and requested extensive information regarding program operations.1"' The letters asked insurers to explain their rating methodolo114. Press Release, Regence BlueShield, Wash. State Med. Ass'n & Am. Med. Ass'n,
Physicians and Regence BlueShield Settle Lawsuit (Aug. 8, 2007), available at http://
clients.seattlewebgroup.com/wsma/files/Downloads/NewsEvents/PressReleases/pr
WSMARegence -Settlement.pdf.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. See, e.g., Letter from Linda A. Lacewell, Counsel for Econ. & Soc. Justice, State
of N.Y., Office of the Attorney Gen., to Susan Adams, Legal Dep't, CIGNA Healthcare
(Aug. 16, 2007), available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/mediacenter/2007/aug/
Cigna%20Final.pdf; Letter from Linda A. Lacewell, Counsel for Econ. & Soc. Justice,
State of N.Y., Office of the Attorney Gen., to James E. Brown, Reg'l Gen. Counsel, Aetna
(Aug. 16, 2007) [hereinafter, Aetna Letter], available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/
mediacenter/2007/aug/Aetna%2OFinal.pdf; Letter from Linda A. Lacewell, Counsel
for Econ. & Soc. Justice, State of N.Y., Office of the Attorney Gen., to Thomas J.
McGuire, Reg'l Deputy Gen. Counsel, UnitedHealthcare (July 13, 2007), available at
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/media center/2007/aug/United%201etter_1.pdf.
118. See sources cited supra note 117.
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gies, their marketing practices, and their plans to comply with New
plans' evaluations of health care professionYork laws regarding health
1 19
als, among other things.
The letters' language implied that the Attorney General viewed
existing rating programs as potentially highly problematic. A letter
concerning an Aetna program, for example, stated that the "program
carries a significant risk of causing consumer confusion, if not deception.' 20 It emphasized the Attorney General's commitment to transparency, and observed that "the goal of transparency is defeated ... if
the information provided is in itself inaccurate or misleading, or based
on flawed data."'12 ' Before requesting information about Aetna's program, the letter noted that poorly designed ratings may "undermin[e]
[consumers'] ability to choose the best doctors," that "[c]onsumers
may be encouraged to choose doctors because they are cheap rather
than because they are good," and that the insurer's "profit motive may
affect the accuracy of its quality and cost-effectiveness rankings
because high-quality doctors may cost Aetna more money. "122
The concerns underlying the letters are unquestionably valid. At
the same time, though, the letters fail to fully acknowledge the environment in which insurer rating programs were developed. First, while it
is true that poor-quality ratings can hinder efforts to choose the best
doctors, there is little reason to believe that, but for these ratings,
patients would have done so. Patients have little systematic evidence
of quality to guide their decisions. Second, while it is possible to
design a program that would lead patients to choose physicians
"because they are cheap rather than because they are good," there is
an inconsistency between being "cheap" and being
not necessarily
"good.' 1 23 It is likely that some physicians are "cheaper" but just as
good as other physicians, or even better. Evidence compiled by
researchers shows that wide regional variation in health care costs is
not necessarily associated with quality, and, indeed, that lower-cost
areas may offer superior care. 12 4 Finally, it may be true that insurers
119. See sources cited supra note 117. Specifically, the letters inquired about

compliance with N.Y. PUB.

HEALTH LAW

§ 4406-d(4) (McKinney 2007) and N.Y.

STATE

INS. LAW § 4803(d) (McKinney 2007). See, e.g., Aetna Letter, supra note 117.
120. Aetna Letter, supra note 117, at 1.
121. Id. at 2.
122. Id. at 3.
123. Furthermore, in a health care system in which individuals are ultimately
responsible for funding their own care, a few patients might prefer to choose
physicians because they are "cheap," even if they are not quite as "good."
124. See, e.g., Katherine Baicker & Amitabh Chandra, Medicare Spending, the
Physician Workforce, and Beneficiaries' Quality of Care, 23

HEALTH

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2009

AFF. w4-184, w4-184

27

Campbell Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 2 [2009], Art. 2

242

CAMPBELL LAW REvIEw

[Vol. 31:215

(or employers that fund health insurance, or employees facing low
wages due to high health care costs) have something to gain if they can
reduce health care costs. Again, however, while some high-quality physicians may be high-cost, others may not be as costly. The ideal
insurer rating program would identify physicians who offer high-quality care efficiently.
By reviewing concerns about rating programs at length, but only
briefly referring to their potential benefits, the letters conveyed the
impression that the programs were inevitably seriously flawed. Admittedly, flaws are a very real concern. As the Aetna letter points out,
claims data may omit potentially relevant clinical information,
databases might be too small to compile meaningful ratings, and
attributing care to a single physician is problematic when multiple
physicians are involved. 12 5 But the current state of health care is also a
very real concern. A well-designed rating program has the potential to
both improve quality and reduce costs by guiding patients to higherquality and/or more efficient providers, and by providing incentives to
providers to change their practices for the better. The Attorney General's letters, and the extensive data demands they contained, could
have had the unfortunate effect of chilling the development and implementation of such programs.
2.

The New York Settlement Agreements

Fortunately, the letters do not appear to have had this effect.
Instead, they led to a series of settlements. The first, with CIGNA,
came just a few months after the letters were issued. 2 6 The settle(2004) (examining quality measures such as provision of beta blockers after heart
attacks and blood sugar monitoring for diabetics and concluding that "states with
higher Medicare spending have lower-quality care"); Elliott S. Fisher et al., The
Implications of Regional Variations in Medicare Spending. Part 2: Health Outcomes and
Satisfaction with Care, 138 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 288, 288 (2003) ("Medicare
enrollees in higher-spending regions receive more care than those in lower-spending
regions but do not have better health outcomes or satisfaction with care."). The Fisher
et al. study found that regional differences in spending were in part related to
physician visits. Specifically, it found that "differences in spending were explained
almost entirely by greater frequency of physician visits, more frequent use of specialist
consultations, more frequent tests and minor procedures, and greater use of the
hospital and intensive care unit," but it "found no evidence to suggest that the pattern
of practice observed in higher-spending regions led to improved survival, slower
decline in functional status, or improved satisfaction with care."
Id. at 292-93.
125. Aetna Letter, supra note 117, at 1.
126. Agreement Between Andrew M. Cuomo, Attorney Gen. of the State of N.Y., and
Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. and CIGNA Healthcare of N.Y., Inc., Agreement Concerning
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ments appear to reflect the input of a variety of stakeholders. 2 7
CIGNA settlement press release, the Attorney General's
explained that "[b]y working together with CIGNA, consumer
cates, doctors, and medical societies, we have been able to create

In the
office
advoa new
1 28

template for ranking programs that the entire industry can follow."'

A later press release mentioned that the "model was created in consultation with, and is supported by, the American Medical Association
and the Medical Society of the State of New York, along with a host of
consumer advocacy groups including the Consumers Union and the
National Partnership for Women & Families." 129 The consumer
groups appeared to be especially supportive of transparent, high-quality ratings. An AARP representative, for example, was quoted as saying
that "[c]onsumers need valid and reliable information to choose a doctor that meets their needs. AARP strongly supports efforts to give consumers this type of information .

"..."130

While the letters requesting information on rating programs
focused almost exclusively on their pitfalls, the settlement agreements
acknowledge that "wide variation in the quality and cost-efficiency of
care delivered by health care providers and professionals is well-documented."' 3 ' They explain that "meaningful efforts to measure and
publicly report the comparative quality of physician practice are
needed to help consumers make informed choices," and that "experience has shown that measuring and publicly reporting physicians' performance based on quality and cost-efficiency supports provider
'
The remainder of the agreeefforts to improve their performance." 132
ments then lay out a series of mechanisms for addressing the potential
the programs to
pitfalls of tiering programs-mechanisms that permit
13 3
quality.
their
ensure
to
help
will
continue, but
Physician Performance Measurement, Reporting and Tiering Programs (Oct. 29, 2007)
[hereinafter CIGNA Settlement], available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/media_
center/2007/oct/CIGNA%2OSettlement%2OFinal.pdf.
127. Id.
128. Press Release, Office of the Attorney Gen., State of N.Y., Attorney General
Cuomo Announces Agreement with CIGNA Creating a New National Model for Doctor
Ranking Programs (Oct. 29, 2007), available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/media_
center/2007/oct/oct29a 07.html.
129. Press Release, Office of the Attorney Gen., State of N.Y., Attorney General
Cuomo Announces Doctor Ranking Agreement with Third Largest Health Insurer in
U.S. (Nov. 13, 2007), available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/media-center/2007/
nov/novl3c_07.html.
130. Id.
131. CIGNA Settlement, supra note 126, at 1.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 3, 4.
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The settlements embrace a model code for "physician performance measurement, reporting and tiering programs" based on the "core
principles" of "accuracy and transparency of information, oversight of
the process, and fairness in comparison of physicians."'1 34 The accuracy and transparency provisions include numerous requirements with
respect to the nature of performance measurement. For example, the
agreements require that measures of cost-efficiency be calculated and
disclosed separately from measures of quality.1 35 While they may in
addition be combined to create a single ranking, the weight attributed
to each portion must be disclosed. 1 3 6 In short, parties to the agreements will no longer be able to designate a "high performance" tier
that mixes quality and cost considerations, leaving consumers to wonder about what exactly "high performance" might mean. The agreements further specify that insurers "shall not conduct rankings based
solely on cost-efficiency, but shall consider quality dimensions." 137
The agreements also attempt to influence insurers' rating
approaches by stating that insurers "should seek to achieve the goals of
1 38
safe, timely, effective, efficient, equitable and patient-centered care,"'
goals that have been advocated by the Institute of Medicine, 139 and
that they "should seek to include patient experience as a measure of
patient-centeredness."' 4 ° Further, the insurers must use quality measures based on nationally recognized guidelines and "[wlhere available
• . shall use measures endorsed by the National Quality Forum
("NQF") or other entities whose work in the area of physician quality
performance is generally accepted in the health care industry"; if NQF
measures are unavailable, measures endorsed by AQA and accreditors

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Id. at 1, 4.
E.g., id. at 4.
Id.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 4.
139. See, e.g., BD. ON HEALTH CARE SERVS., supra note 69, at 1, 118-19 (listing aims
for quality improvement).
140. CIGNA Settlement, supra note 126, at 5.
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should be used.1 4 1 Other agreement provisions focus on issues such
142
as risk adjustment, sample size, and data currency and accuracy.
The agreements emphasize the importance of transparency,
stressing that the methodology and data used must be fully disclosed.
They require insurers to explain to consumers the rating system and
data limitations, and the fact that there is a risk of error. 14 3 The insurers must also disclose detailed information about methodologies to
process for
physicians, while at the same time establishing an 1appeals
44
physicians to challenge their performance ratings.
Finally, the agreements require insurers to contract with a monitoring entity known as a "Ratings Examiner," which "shall be a nationally-recognized standard-setting organization" approved by the Office
of the Attorney General. 1 45 It must be "national in scope, independent, and an Internal Revenue Code § 501(c)(3) organization, and
shall have existing standards and collection processes that would
enable the transparency and accuracy terms of this Agreement to be
satisfied."' 4 6 The Ratings Examiner's task is to review the insurer's
47
rating programs with respect to all settlement agreement provisions. 1
3.

The Aftermath: Rating Programs Move Forward

By February 2009, numerous insurers had entered agreements
with the New York Attorney General, and many committed to follow
141. Id. at 5. The National Quality Forum is a not-for-profit organization that seeks
to "promote a common approach to measuring and reporting healthcare quality" by
endorsing consensus standards on performance measures. Nat'l Quality Forum, The
National Quality Forum's Consensus Development Process (May 9, 2007), available at
http://www.qualityforum.org/pdf/txConsensusProcessVersion 1-8_05-24-07.pdf; Nat'l
Quality Forum, Membership, http://www.qualityforum.org/about/membership/ (last
visited Mar. 10, 2009). Its broad membership includes consumers, payers, insurers,
physicians, hospitals, drug companies, accreditation organizations, government
agencies, and other health care-related organizations. Nat'l Quality Forum, Members
(Feb. 2009), http://www.qualityforum.org/pdf/list of-members.pdf. The AQA is
similarly a "large voluntary multi-stakeholder collaborative of physicians, consumers,
purchasers, health insurance plans and others" with goals that include developing "[a]
set of measures for physician performance that stakeholders can use in private health
insurance plan contracts and with government purchasers." AQA, Home, http://www.
aqaalliance.org/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2009).
142. E.g., CIGNA Settlement, supra note 126, at 5-6 (risk adjustment and sample
size); id. at 10 (data).
143. See, e.g., id. at 7-8.
144. See, e.g., id. at 9-10.
145. Id. at 10-11.
146. Id. at 11.
147. See, e.g., id. at 10-11.
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the model code's provisions not just in their New York plans, but also
nationwide. 1 48 By adopting widespread reforms to their rating systems, the insurers may have increased the likelihood of avoiding
actions by other attorneys general, as well as by state legislatures. In
2008, Colorado adopted the Physician Designation Disclosure Act,
which imposes accuracy and transparency requirements for physician
ratings similar to those in the New York settlements, 149 but other states
have been less willing to intervene in the ratings process.
Another factor promoting nationwide reforms of health plan rating programs is the Patient Charter for Physician Performance Measurement, Reporting and Tiering Programs (Patient Charter), which
was released in 2008.15° The Patient Charter was created by the Consumer-Purchaser Disclosure Project, "a group of leading employer, consumer, and labor organizations working toward a common goal to
ensure that all Americans have access to publicly reported health care
performance information." 151 Groups endorsing the Patient Charter
include AARP, AFL-CIO, the Pacific Business Group on Health (a
group with members that "represent approximately 3,000,000 employees, retirees and their families and nearly $10 billion in annual health
care expenditures"1 5 2 ), and the National Partnership for Women and
Families, which was among the organizations mentioned as supporters
1
of the New York settlements.

5 3

148. Press Release, Office of the Attorney Gen., State of N.Y., Attorney General
Cuomo Expands Historic Health Insurance Reform; Two Leading Insurance
Companies End Relationship with Ingenix (Feb. 10, 2009), available at http://www.
oag.state.ny.us/media-center/2009/feb/feblOa_09.html.
149. COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 25-38-101 to -108 (2008); Emily Berry, Colorado Moves to
Regulate Tiered Networks, AM. MED. NEWS, May 5, 2008, at 22, availableat http://www.
ama-assn.org/amednews/2008/05/05/bisbO5O5.htm (describing Colorado proposed
statute and its relationship to New York settlements and Patient Charter for Physician
Performance Measurement, Reporting and Tiering Programs).
150. Press Release, Consumer-Purchaser Disclosure Project, Consumers, Health
Care Purchasers, Physicians, and Health Insurers Announce Agreement on Principles
to Guide Physician Performance Rating (Apr. 1, 2008), available at http://
healthcaredisclosure.org/docs/files/PatientCharterDisclosureRelease040108.pdf.
151. Consumer-Purchaser Disclosure Project, Welcome to the Disclosure Project,
http://healthcaredisclosure.org/docs/?DoclD=6%20 (last visited Mar. 11, 2009).
152. Pac. Bus. Group on Health, Membership, http://www.pbgh.org/aboutpbgh/
membership.asp (last visited Mar. 11, 2009) (describing group membership).
153. See Press Release, Consumer-Purchaser Disclosure Project, supra note 150, at 1
(listing groups endorsing Charter); Press Release, Office of the Attorney Gen., State of
N.Y., supra note 129 (listing groups supporting settlement); Pac. Bus. Group on
Health, supra note 152 (describing group membership).
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The press release announcing the Patient Charter explained that
there is "wide variation in physician performance yet there is little
information available to help consumers find and choose those who
provide the best quality care" and that "[p]rograms that measure and
report on the performance of physicians are integral to reforming
health care to improve health outcomes for patients, create a more efficient health care system, and ultimately expand access to health
care."' 1 54 It stated that "[wihere embraced, the Patient Charter will
ensure both consumers and physicians will be able to understand,
1' 5 5
trust and contribute to how health plans rate doctors' performance.'
The Patient Charter calls for measures that are meaningful to consumers, that include both quality and cost-efficiency information, and
that reflect the six aims of the Institute of Medicine. 1 56 The Charter
states that "[m]easures and methodology should be transparent and
valid," that limitations should be disclosed, that certain aspects of the
measurement process should be assessed against national standards,
that data should be aggregated wherever feasible, and that the effects
of rating programs should be evaluated. 15 7 It advocates the use of
measures based on national standards, including measures endorsed
by the National Quality Forum, and, if such measures are absent, those
endorsed by AQA, the National Committee for Quality Assurance
(NCQA), the Joint Commission, and federal agencies. 1 58 It requires
programs to allow physicians to request reviews of results they believe
are inaccurate.' 59 It also suggests that health plans ask an "independent health care quality standard-setting organization to review" their
tiering programs.' 6 ° In short, the key features of the Patient Charter
closely resemble those of the New York settlement agreements. Health
plans that have signed on to the Patient Charter include the large insurers Aetna, CIGNA, UnitedHealthcare, and Wellpoint, among others. 6 '
154. Press Release, Consumer-Purchaser Disclosure Project, supra note 150, at 2.
155. Id.
156.

CONSUMER-PURCHASER

DISCLOSURE PROJECT,

PERFORMANCE

MEASUREMENT,

TRANSPARENCY,

FAIRNESS

AND

REPORTING
INDEPENDENT
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AND TIERING
REVIEW

CHARTER

FOR

PROGRAMS:

PHYSICIAN

ENSURING

(2008), available at http://

healthcaredisclosure.org/docs/files/PatientCharter.pdf.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161.

CONSUMER-PURCHASER DISCLOSURE PROJECT, STATUS OF HEALTH PLANS AND OTHER

(2008), available at
http://healthcaredisclosure.org/docs/files/PatientCharterStatus.pdf.
ORGANIZATIONS COMMITTED TO FULFILLING THE PATIENT CHARTER
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NCQA, a health plan accreditation organization that issues its
own report cards on health plans,1 6 2 has been approved as an independent rating program reviewer both by the Consumer-Purchaser Disclosure Project

163

and by the New York Attorney General. 164 It has now

16 5
posted online its initial reviews of several New York health plans.

C. A Few Observations
This brief description of the evolution of health plan physician
rating programs offers interesting insights into not just the development of performance measurement mechanisms, but also the health
care regulatory process. First, it highlights a shift in attitude in the
quality reporting area. Many of the earliest efforts by health plans to
create tiers based on cost and quality elicited strong public objections
from physicians, along with calls to halt the programs. Resistance to
rating programs was widespread. Today, objections to rating programs
remain frequent, as evidenced by recent lawsuits, media coverage, and
the New York letters. The Regence settlement, however, hinted at program features that would permit health plans and physicians to find
common ground, such as physician participation in measure development, transparent methodologies, and opportunities for appeal. The
New York settlement agreements and the Patient Charter pushed
health plan quality ratings forward by emphasizing their potential benefits, while at the same time creating a framework to ensure high-caliber quality ratings, transparency for physicians and consumers, and
independent oversight. In short, the focus seems to have shifted
toward collaborative development of mechanisms that will correct rating program flaws.
Second, the chronology highlights the contributions of multiple
stakeholders to the development of quality reporting programs. Newspaper reports on conflicts such as the one in St. Louis often focus on
the insurers that create rating programs and the provider groups that
resist them. Reports about litigation naturally focus on the parties
involved, which, again, are typically the report card producers and the
162. Nat'l Comm. for Quality Assurance, supra note 9.
163. Press Release, Consumer-Purchaser Disclosure Project, Assuring Fair Doctor
Ratings: Nonprofit Approved to Independently Review Health Plan Programs That
Assess Doctors (Aug. 13, 2008), available at http://healthcaredisclosure.org/docs/
files/NCQARelease081308.pdf.
164. See Nat'l Comm. for Quality Assurance, Ratings Examiner Report on New York
Health Plan Methodologies, http://nyrxreport.ncqa.org/Overview.aspx (last visited
Mar. 9, 2009) (announcing that NCQA had been appointed as Ratings Examiner).
165. See id. (providing links to reports on extent to which various health plans meet
requirements of New York settlement agreements).
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rated professionals or their representatives. The New York letters were
created by the Office of the Attorney General and sent directly to
health plans operating high performance networks. But as the chronology demonstrates, other stakeholders, especially employer groups
and consumer groups, have played major roles in shaping rating programs and their oversight. Health plans often develop rating programs
at the behest of their employer-clients, and employers have supported
the creation and implementation of the Patient Charter. Similarly,
consumer advocacy groups played a role in both the New York settlements and the Patient Charter. These groups have shown a strong
commitment to the diffusion of rating programs and, like physicians,
want to ensure that these programs are of high quality.
Third, while consumers, employers, and physicians all have
exerted influence over the structure of health plan tiering programs,
the involvement of a regulator appears to have been key in achieving
rapid and widespread reforms. The letters issued by the Office of the
Attorney General of New York focused the attention of major health
plans on the problematic aspects of health plan rating programs. The
settlement agreements offered a platform for multiple stakeholders to
offer their input into the creation of a specific framework to address
these problems. The Attorney General's legal powers will help to
ensure that the framework is actually implemented.
One final observation is that the settlement agreements and
Patient Charter offer much promise as an approach to regulate rating
programs, but also have limitations. In focusing on the goals of accuracy, transparency, oversight, and fairness, these documents establish
a useful general framework that will help to ensure that consumers
realize the full benefits of quality reporting. Many of the agreements'
requirements address areas of longstanding concern. The requirement
to separately identify cost and quality-related criteria, for example,
may help to alleviate physicians' concerns about ratings, while making
measures more useful for patients. The requirement of the appointment of an independent ratings examiner takes advantage of third
party expertise in program oversight and helps to avoid many of the
66
problems that can arise if regulations are too detailed.'
At the same time, some agreement provisions may prove to be
overly prescriptive. For example, why must plans consider quality as
well as cost in developing performance ratings? It is important that
166. Admittedly, third-party auditors and accreditation organizations are not
without their own difficulties. To the extent these organizations exercise discretion
and have objectives that differ from those of regulators (or consumers), their decisions
will deviate from those that regulators (or consumers) would have made.
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performance ratings be accurate and not misleading. It would not be
appropriate to label a rating based solely on cost as a "performance
rating," because the label may mislead customers into thinking that
quality has been factored into the evaluation. And, of course, as this
Essay argues, there are many good reasons to develop and publish
quality ratings. In an environment in which treatment costs vary considerably and good quality measures are not always available, however,
it seems that there should be room for enterprising health plans to
develop entirely cost-based performance measures. To be sure, such
programs may not be popular with consumers, who would worry
about potential cost-quality tradeoffs, and even if they were popular, a
health plan could skirt the prohibition simply by weighting performance measures heavily toward cost-based components. Nevertheless,
detailed standards remain a concern. The basic problem is one that
plagues any form of standard-setting: the more detailed the requirements and prohibitions the agreements contain, the less room there
will be for benefit-enhancing innovation sparked by the competitive
process. 167
Ultimately, however, the New York settlement agreements and the
Patient Charter represent an important step forward for health plan
rating programs and for health care quality report cards more generally. In the future, health plan enrollees will be significantly more
likely to gain access to helpful and reliable performance measures.
III.

ENHANCING GAINS FROM QUALITY REPORTING

Health care quality report cards have significant potential to
increase the quality of American health care, but that potential has
only begun to be realized. Report card developers, government enti167. Another concern along these lines is that the agreements refer to specific

standard-setting organizations to guide measure choice. On the one hand, this level of

specificity can help boost rating program quality in the short term; the NQF and AQA
are both expert, well-respected organizations. This approach also helps to achieve

standardization, increasing the likelihood that provider ratings will be consistent

across insurers and trusted by consumers. In addition, the New York settlement
agreements leave at least some room to choose alternative measures. See, e.g., CIGNA
Settlement, supra note 126, at 5 ("Where available, CIGNA shall use measures
endorsed by the National Quality Forum ('NQF') or other entities whose work in the
area of physician quality performance is generally accepted in the healthcare
industry."). On the other hand, there is a risk that the agreements' specificity (for
example, the requirement that AQA and accreditors' measures be used only if NQFendorsed measures are unavailable) might stifle the development of alternative
approaches to quality measurement or standard-setting. See id.
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ties, regulators, payers, providers, researchers, and consumers can all
take steps to enhance the gains from quality reporting.
Report card developers can obviously have a dramatic impact on
of report cards as a quality improvement tool for conusefulness
the
sumers, physicians, and others. Whether report card creators are government agencies, health plans, non-profit organizations, commercial
organizations, or others, they should work to make report cards accurate and transparent, relevant to their targeted users, and user-friendly.
They should work to create new measures, particularly outcome-based
measures, that are relevant for patients with specific diseases or in
need of specific types of treatment. They should focus on developing
measures of physician or physician group quality, given that physicians are often patients' points of entry into the health care system.
They should consider not only what information consumers do value,
such as patient experience information, but also the information that
more fully informed consumers would likely value, such as technical
clinical quality measures. They should explain why the measures they
use are important. They should publicize the availability of their
report cards and facilitate potential users' efforts to find them.
Governments have many potential roles to play in supporting the
68 Government entities should
development of effective report cards.'
continue to publish report cards. Existing federal report cards on hospitals and nursing homes are potentially useful starting points for consumers. State report cards for specific types of care, like those in New
York and Pennsylvania, are potentially helpful for consumers and providers alike and provide useful models for other conditions and other
states. Even if state or local government entities lack the resources to
create their own report card data-collection programs, they can use
existing data to present information in a useful way to their residents.
Recently, the Los Angeles County Supervisors asked California state
officials to require California nursing homes to display the star ratings
available on Medicare's Nursing Home Compare website, as well as to
16 9 This
include rating system information in admissions agreements.
is one way to raise public awareness of quality ratings and to
encourage greater responsiveness of nursing homes to Medicare quality indicators.
168. For a fuller discussion of the role of government organizations in quality
improvement, see Madison, supra note 7, at 1631-51.
169. Molly Hennessy-Fiske, California Is Urged to Require Nursing Homes to Display
Star Ratings, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2009, avaliable at http://www.latimes.com/features/
9
,0, 2 7 9 9 8 0 6 .story.
health/medicine/la-me-nursing19-2009jan
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Government entities can also promote health care quality ratings
by strengthening the foundations of quality measurement systems.
They can fund research on quality measurement and support measurement standardization efforts, where appropriate. They can promote
the adoption of electronic medical records, which will greatly facilitate
efforts to collect the detailed and comprehensive data necessary to create high-quality performance measures. Finally, they can search for
ways to make data available to entities wishing to use it to create performance ratings. The fragmented nature of the health care system
makes it difficult for any single entity to gather enough data to produce meaningful quality ratings. By pooling public and private payer
data, more ratings become possible. While the federal government has
emphasized the importance of transparency and advocated quality
measurement initiatives, 170 it has not always acted in full support of
these goals. Citing concerns about physician privacy and a permanent
injunction issued in the 1970s, HHS has resisted efforts by various
entities to obtain Medicare data; most recently, it appealed (successfully) a federal district court ruling that had required it to turn over
data pursuant to a Freedom of Information Act request. 17 1 It is of

course important to consider privacy concerns-particularly patients'
privacy concerns-in constructing frameworks for sharing data, but
overcoming such barriers is a key step toward improving health care
quality reporting. If necessary, Congress should pass legislation permitting sharing of Medicare data for the purposes of developing rating
72

programs. 1

170. See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Value-Driven Health Care
Home, http://www.hhs.gov/valuedriven/ (last visited Mar. 11, 2009) (discussing
importance of transparency in price and quality in improving health care system).
171. See Consumers' Checkbook, Ctr. for Study of Servs. v. U.S. Dep't of Health &
Human Servs., 554 F.3d 1046, 1049-51 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (noting that HHS argued that
physician claims data was exempt from the Freedom of Information Act under a
provision barring disclosure of certain files that would constitute a "clearly
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy"); Robert Pear, Employers Push White House
to Disclose Medicare Data, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 11, 2006, at Al, available at http://www.
nytimes.com/2006/04/1 1/washington/1 lmedicare.html (reporting that Medicare had
refused to share data with Business Roundtable, which represents many large
companies). The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia found that "physicians
have a substantial privacy interest in the total payments they receive from Medicare for
covered services." Consumers' Checkbook, 554 F.3d at 1051. The court also found
that "the requested data does not serve any FOIA-related public interest in disclosure."
Id. at 1056. It therefore concluded that the requested information was exempt from
disclosure. Id.
172. Some employers have advocated for such legislation, and relevant bills were
introduced in Congress in 2006 and 2007. See Draper et al., supra note 27, at 6 & n.5
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As illustrated by Part II, regulators also have an important role to
play in supporting the development of high-quality quality ratings.
Most obviously, public regulators such as the New York Attorney General can step in to ensure that ratings do not mislead consumers. Private regulators, such as the NCQA, can assist in this task. Private
entities such as large employers can take on similar regulatory functions. For example, they can insist that any health care quality ratings
provided to their employees are based on solid methodologies and
accurate data.
The New York settlement agreements and the Patient Charter offer
a good starting point for those seeking to shape reporting programs.
Another interesting proposal for regulation of health care quality ratings is to create a panel that would "define standards for measuring
and reporting quality of care," "describe the optimal training and certification needed to measure and report quality of care," "design an
auditing system," and "develop a system to ensure that health care
organizations are held accountable for the quality of care they
report." 173 Regardless of the specific regulatory approach taken to
encourage accuracy of quality rating, it is important that it permit continued experimentation in quality measurement and reporting.
Entities that fund the provision of health care, including public
payers such as Medicare and Medicaid as well as private employers,
can guide patients to higher-quality providers through the information
they provide to beneficiaries. Benefit designs such as tiering can draw
additional attention to quality issues. Payers can also potentially significantly increase the returns to quality reporting by tying payment to
performance on quality measures. Pay-for-performance programs have
become very popular, although evidence of their impact on quality is
still limited. 174 In theory, however, paying more for higher quality will
provide an even greater incentive to improve along measured dimensions than that provided by public reporting alone.

(describing employer advocacy and citing to 2006 proposed legislation); see also
Medicare Quality Enhancement Act of 2007, S. 1544, 110th Cong. (permitting use of
Medicare claims data under certain circumstances for compilation of quality and
efficiency reports).
173. Peter J. Pronovost et al., The GAAP in Quality Measurement and Reporting, 298
JAMA 1800, 1802 (2007).
174. See Madison, supra note 7, at 1606-07 (providing examples of pay-forperformance programs); Meredith B. Rosenthal et al., Climbing Up the Pay-forPerformance Learning Curve: Where Are the Early Adopters Now?, 26 HEALTH AFF. 1674,
1678-79 (2007) (discussing evaluations of effects of pay-for-performance programs).
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Health care providers can increase the benefits of quality reporting in multiple ways.' 75 First, providers can take advantage of performance measurements of all kinds to improve their own care. If a
quality measure suggests that their care is below average, then they
should identify explanations for the low rating; if the rating stems
from deficiencies in their delivery of care, they can strive to correct
them. Providers able to achieve above-average quality measures
through innovative delivery systems can be emulated by other providers. Second, providers can collaborate to create performance measures
appropriate for their own use in improving care or making referrals, as
well as measures appropriate for patient use in selecting providers.
Physician knowledge and experience are critical inputs into the development of high-caliber quality ratings, and yet many specialty societies
have been slow to become involved in quality measurement activities. 1 76 By further expanding their involvement in quality reporting,
providers can increase the likelihood that measures are both accurate
and useful. Third, providers can help patients understand and use
health care quality report cards by alerting patients to their existence
and by explaining both their advantages and their limitations.
Researchers can improve health care quality report cards by continuing to develop health care quality measures. More treatment-specific and condition-specific quality measures are needed, as are more
outcome measures of all types. Researchers can also take a closer look
at attribution issues. Physicians are rightfully concerned about being
subjected to performance measures over which they have little or no
control. In some situations, however, it may make sense to develop
quality measures that capture not what a specific provider actually
controls, but instead what the provider could influence in an optimally
structured delivery system. 1 77 A quality rating might be assigned, for

example, to a provider in a good position to coordinate care, even if
175. For a more detailed discussion of physicians' professional obligations in a
world in which information about provider quality is available, see Kristin Madison &
Mark Hall, Quality Regulation in the Information Age: Challenges for Medical
Professionalism, inMEDICAL PROFESSIONALISM IN A NEW INFORMATION AGE, supra note 1.
176. See Timothy G. Ferris et al., Physician Specialty Societies and the Development of
Physician Performance Measures, 26 HEALTH AFF. 1712, 1712 (2007) (stating that
physician specialty societies "have not yet played a major role in the development of
measures" and exploring barriers to and facilitators of specialty society involvement).
177. The Institute of Medicine has similarly proposed "that measurement of the
health care delivery system should not be impeded by the impossibility of first
identifying an accountable actor or the perception that responsibility for care is
outside one's realm of control." BD. ON HEALTH CARE SERVS., supra note 69, at 98. It
observes that "one valuable and intended effect of the integrated measurement system
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that provider does not engage in coordination activities. Doing so
would inform patients about an important dimension of care, while at
the same time encouraging providers to assume more responsibility for
the dimension of quality that is measured. More research is required,
however, to determine how such measures should be structured.
Researchers can also advance efforts to improve report cards by
studying their use by consumers, physicians, and others. With respect
to consumers, for example, we need to better understand the formats
and types of content that are most effective at communicating important information. We also need to continue to study the effects of
report cards on health care quality, health care costs, and health care
disparities. With the appearance of new report cards come more
opportunities to conduct studies of report cards' impact.
Finally, consumers and patients can greatly enhance the benefits
of quality report cards simply by using them. They should be aware
that quality differs across providers along a variety of dimensions, and
should consider what kinds of provider characteristics they value.
They should search a variety of reputable sources for information
about these characteristics, keeping in mind that measures may differ.
They should also consider that existing quality measures are unlikely
to fully reflect provider quality, so a quality report card should be only
one of the sources they consider. But it should certainly be one.
CONCLUSION

Much work remains to be done in developing appropriate health
care quality measures, ensuring their accuracy and transparency, and
encouraging their widespread use. Report card developers, government entities, regulators, payers, providers, researchers, and consumers all could potentially contribute to efforts to improve the quality of
report cards and expand their impact. Given report cards' considerable potential as a tool to improve health care quality, they have reason
to do so.

proposed by the committee could be to induce new parties to assume such
responsibility." Id.
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